North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, CRS Report for Congress, March 22, 2006, 21 pages. (북한의 미 화폐 위조에 관한 미의회 조사국 최근 보고서, 2006년 3월 22일.)

전문: http://americancorners.or.kr/e-infousa/NKCounterfeiting.pdf

North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency

Summary

The United States has accused the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) of counterfeiting U.S. $100 Federal Reserve notes (supernotes) and passing them off in various countries. This is one of several illicit activities by North Korea apparently done to generate foreign exchange that is used to purchase imports or finance government activities abroad.

Although Pyongyang denies complicity in any counterfeiting operation, at least $45 million in such supernotes of North Korean origin have been detected in circulation, and estimates are that the country earns from $15 to $25 million per year from counterfeiting. The illegal nature of any counterfeiting activity makes opensource information on the scope and scale of DPRK counterfeiting and distribution operations incomplete.

South Korean intelligence has corroborated information on North Korean production of forged currency prior to 1998, and certain individuals have been indicted in U.S. courts for distributing such forged currency.

Media reports in January 2006 state that Chinese investigators have independently confirmed allegations of DPRK counterfeiting. For the United States, North Korean counterfeiting represents a direct attack on

a protected national asset; might undermine confidence in the U.S. dollar and depress its value; and, if done extensively enough, potentially damage the U.S. economy.

The earnings from counterfeiting also could be significant to yongyang, and may be used to purchase weapons technology, fund travel broad, meet “slush fund” purchases of luxury foreign goods, or even

underwrite the DPRK’s nuclear program.

U.S. policy toward the alleged counterfeiting is split between law enforcement efforts and political and diplomatic pressures. On the law enforcement side, individuals have been indicted and the Banco Delta Asia bank in Macao (a territory of China) has been named as a primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act.

This started a financial chain reaction under which banks, not only from the United States, but from other nations have declined to deal with even some legitimate North Korea traders. North Koreans appear to be moving their international bank accounts to Chinese and other banks. Pyongyang has cited the Banco Delta Asia action in refusing to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear program.

The political/security track attempts to stop the alleged counterfeiting activity though diplomatic pressures, the Illicit Activities Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and back channel talks. Bush administration policymakers reportedly are divided between those favoring a negotiated settlement, (verifiable curtailment of illicit activities and a return to the six-party talks) and those favoring an approach of

tightening economic sanctions and other measures designed to undermine support for the ruling regime and compel a change in policy. Currently the Administration’s policy reportedly is to pressure North Korea, but keep the negotiations going.

This report will be updated as needed.

Contents

- U.S. Interests

- Limits on information

-The Need to Counterfeit Currency

- Alleged Areas of DPRK Criminal Activities

- Amount of Bogus U.S. Currency

- Denial of Counterfeiting by North Korea

- State-Sponsored Counterfeiting?

- A Summary of Main Points

- Policy Implications